Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei by Paul R. Goldin

Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei by Paul R. Goldin

Author:Paul R. Goldin
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht


For the Mohists, Confucian particularism was nothing more than a “spinning potter’s wheel” which pointed in a different, random direction, according to the whim of each Confucian. Instead, the Mohists offered a generalist approach, in the form of their consequentialist standard—judging policies by their tendency to impartially maximize wealth, populousness and social order.

But for all their differences, the Mohists and the Confucians share an important similarity. Both of them depend, in their own ways, on the ethical goodness of government officials. Mohist government needs officials who have the completely impartial benevolence that leads them to act solely for the greater good. They must also have the righteousness that leads them to “identify with their superiors,” by loyally following whatever orders they are given. For Han Fei, this makes Mohism as naively idealistic as Confucianism.

Much of Han Fei’s political philosophy is a synthesis of the thought of three previous thinkers: Shen Dao, Shen Buhai, and Lord Shang. (Anyone who assumes that this makes Han Fei’s thought derivative or uninteresting should consider the examples of Thomas Aquinas and Zhu Xi 朱熹—who also are known for “merely” synthesizing earlier thinkers.) Shen Dao’s doctrine of the power of shi 勢, “position,” is a direct challenge to the Confucian conception of Virtue. Confucius conceived of Virtue as necessary and sufficient for effectively ruling others, but, in his explication of Shen Dao’s view, Han Fei argues that it is neither. He points out that, when the sages Yao and Shun were commoners, they could get few people to obey them, and certainly could not mobilize the empire for their projects. (Hence, Virtue is not sufficient to rule.) On the other hand, the tyrants Jie and Zhòu, despite their lack of Virtue, exercised immense power. (Hence, Virtue is not necessary to rule.) In addition, he notes that we cannot have an ongoing government system that depends upon the leadership of kings possessed of sagacious Virtue, because such individuals are so rare: “…even if a Yao, Shun, Jie, or Zhòu only emerged once in every 1,000 generations, it would still seem like they were both bumping shoulders and treading on each other’s heels. But those who actually govern each age are typically somewhere in the middle between these two extremes” (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005: 330). Han Fei concludes, “worthiness and wisdom are never enough to subdue the multitude, while the power of status and position are sufficient to make even the worthy bend.” (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005: 327).

The term “position” (shi 勢—also translated as “power” and “circumstantial advantage” in this volume) is used in military texts, where it refers to tactical advantages a unit has because of factors such as terrain (Sawyer 1994: 187–88). Han Fei gives this notion a social application, describing it as “the differences in power and status set up by human beings” (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005: 329). Everyone who lives in human society has an intuitive understanding of the kind of phenomena he is referring to. If I am the professor of a class and I announce that the first paper is due next Friday by 5 p.



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